Consciência e intencionalidade na filosofia analítica: uma introdução à filosofia de John Searle

Abstract

Biological naturalism is the thesis that provides a solution for the mind-body problem and define what are the concepts of the mind, mental states and will. In this research it is shown the main point of views of philosophy of mind: property duaslism, anoumalous monism, materialism and physicalism, and central contributions with each view with the double purpose: set the main problems of each point of view and shown the principle elements of each view that inspire the endeavor of Searle to develop your own view – also designated nonreductive physicalism. On this way, biological naturalism holds the view that mental phenomena are high-level product of the lower-level neurobiological processes in the brain. Once that are caused by those neurobiological processes, they can’t be reduced to their own physical causes, because mental phenomena had intrinsecal characteristics who are not be able to be understoods in a objective way, such as subjectivity, qualitative characteristics for perceive the world and intentionality. Counsciousness are the foreground of the mind and it is in counsciousness that mental phenomena and intentional states are performed. Mental phenomena corresponds to toughts, feelings, sensations that individuals had and its can be conscious or not – respectively, as a wish to drink coffe or a stomach iche. Intentional states are components of mental phenomena and they are who connect the mental phenomena with the state of things in the world. In the jargon of common sense, intentional states can be designed as the own will and they represents our own beliefs, desires, wants, dares, wishes and volitions about a state of thing in the world. In one hand intentional states are composed by a psychological mode – if it express a belief, desire, want, and so on – and a representative content – the state of thing in the world that the intentional state are directed or about. Intentional states can be performed through speech acts, perceptual experiences or deliberative actions. When an intentional state had a representative content express in the world, it is had a direction of fit and conditions of satisfaction, when had not, the intentional state becomes only a mental representation. Last, but not least, intentional states always had a synergy with a background – that includes capacites, skills, assumptions and pressupositions – and a network with other intentional states – that may be from the other individuals or institutions.