Algumas considerações em torno das pretensões da razão prática em Kant: a espontaneidade como chave para a “dedução” do princípio supremo da moralidade

Abstract

In this paper, I propose an interpretation for the controversial third section of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, arguing that the spontaneity of reason plays a central role for the proof of freedom as the foundation of moral law. Without wishing to deal exhaustively with this entire section (and the different problems involved in it), I will resort to a very precise selection of texts and limit my analysis to their initial topics. At first, (I) I outline some of the more general problems involved in this third section; (II) I present my arguments in defense of the centrality of the spontaneity of reason to the conclusive force of the proof intended by Kant; (III) I explore one of the possible consequences of this interpretation with respect to the limitation (and articulation) between theoretical use and practical use of the reason.