Individualidade e vis cogitativa no Grande comentário ao De Anima de Averróis

Abstract

The Averroes' thesis on the unity of the material intellect was largely rejected by the thirteenth century, especially by Thomas Aquinas. The accusation affirms that if man were deprived of the presence of the intellect in his soul, nothing left of his autonomy and individuality. However, Averroes does not seem to regard this separation as a problem, human individuality will follow another path which will not rest on the presence of the intellect in the soul, but on another kind of relationship, established through the inner senses of human souls with intellects that are separated from matter. In this sense, the aim of this article is to analyze how the called vis cogitativa, the main internal sense present in man, is the element used by Averroes to guarantee the autonomy and the individuality of man’s thoughts.